Containing the Madhes insurgency

As Bam Dev Gautam was sworn in as the home minister, he must have been acutely aware of the awesome burden placed on his shoulders – of restoring law and order in a transitional nation ravaged by lawlessness. There were already reports of sporadic clashes between the Young Communist League and his own party's Youth Force, in one case serious enough to clamp a curfew. In the eastern hills, new groups seeking autonomy were wreaking havoc. To make matters worse, the activities of armed groups in the tarai, which had been receding, once again emerged with prominence. How the home minister deals with the peace and security situation in the country will test the effectiveness of the newly formed government, including its very survival.
The new government has the important task of developing a sound strategy to resolve the problem with armed groups in the tarai. In dealing with these armed groups, it is essential to distinguish between the political and the criminal. The political armed groups, including the one led by Goit, need to be brought to the table for talks. Criminal groups that have assumed a political alias, which will be the focus in this piece, need a firm fist.

There was a time when we could laugh with ease at the various splinter groups and their fanciful names– Madhesi Virus Killers, Tarai Cobra, or the LTTE. However, it soon proved that these small splinter groups were more effective, more localized. While they could not engage in skirmishes with the police, they could abduct and kill in their strongholds at will. What they lacked in their political beliefs, they made up with their viciousness. Without a clear political ideology, and even less clear moral standards, they could—and did—whatever they wished to.

The causes of the origin of these criminally-motivated armed groups are many. In the Panchayat era, they were courted to sustain the autocratic regime that had little legitimacy and presence in the region. In the post-1990 democratic era, criminal groups were cultivated by political parties for electoral gains in the general and local elections. With most of the leaders in the tarai not residing there or even remotely concerned with the largely Madhesi electorate, you needed muscle to win elections. And you needed money. The criminal gangs gave the parties both—power, and money through the lucrative business of smuggling. In return, the criminals got patronage.

That cycle of crime and impunity today has taken an uglier turn as those criminal gangs, resurrected as armed groups, can choose their own masters, and sometime a multiple of masters. Thus, we have a situation today where one armed group operates for the benefit of different parties, often oppositional ones. They will work for the royalists, for foreign forces, for anyone who pays.

Then of course, there are the armed groups that have emerged due to the Maoist insurgency—some as splinters from the Maoist party and others as opposition to the insurgency. The major factions from the Maoists are probably the more political ones—the Janatantrik Tarai Mukti Morchas (JTMMs), separately led by Jay Krishna Goit and Jwala Singh. Others—such as Ranvir Singh or Rajan Mukti—also splintered from the JTMMs, but the leaders—were active in 'protecting' the landed class from the Maoists during the insurgency.

Today, with the Maoists in the government, there is added incentive for the government to clamp down on armed groups. The armed groups are sworn enemies of the Maoists. There are reports that the Maoists have started pressuring the families of armed group members to provide information on their whereabouts and to surrender their kin. The police too are routinely provided information by the Maoists and are urged to take stern action. The members of armed groups are desperate with little space to maneuver, which may account for their relative inactivity.

Furthermore, the deployment of fresh faces in the security apparatus has broken, to a large extent, whatever nexus the armed groups may have had with the police.

We ought not, however, be lulled by their silence. They may have quieted down for now, but this is mere hibernation. They may spring back to life whenever the country needs a little instability, for the benefit of any of the various stakeholders in Nepal's peace process. The armed groups have proved good at evolving to thrive in Nepal's shaky political climate—from the Panchayat era to the current transitional one.

We have entered an era of confrontational politics where battles fought in the streets will be used to win better bargains in the parliament. All actors, from within and without, will use a variety of legitimate and illegitimate means to wrangle the arms of their opponents. In all the armed-wranglings, it would be wise of the actors to leave the armed groups out of the equation.

From the Kathmandu Post

http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=159891